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ND-23-0465
10 CFR 52.99(c)(1)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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Washington, DC 20555-0001

Southern Nuclear Operating Company
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit 4
ITAAC Closure Notification on Completion of ITAAC 2.2.01.08 [Index Number 109]

Ladies and Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10 CFR 52.99(c)(1), the purpose of this letter is to notify the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) of the completion of Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Unit 4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) item 2.2.01.08 [Index Number 109]. This ITAAC verifies that containment electrical penetration assemblies are protected against currents that are greater than the continuous ratings.

The closure process for this ITAAC is based on the guidance described in NEI 08-01, "Industry Guideline for the ITAAC Closure Process under 10 CFR Part 52," which was endorsed by the NRC in Regulatory Guide 1.215.

This letter contains no new NRC regulatory commitments. Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) requests NRC staff confirmation of this determination and publication of the required notice in the Federal Register per 10 CFR 52.99.

If there are any questions, please contact Kelli Roberts at 706-848-6991.

Respectfully submitted,



Jamie M. Coleman
Regulatory Affairs Director Vogtle 3 & 4

Enclosure: Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Unit 4
Completion of ITAAC 2.2.01.08 [Index Number 109]
JMC/MKO/sfr

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ND-23-0465
Page 2 of 2

cc: Regional Administrator, Region II
 Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)
 Director, Vogtle Project Office NRR
 Senior Resident Inspector – Vogtle 3 & 4

**Southern Nuclear Operating Company
ND-23-0465
Enclosure**

**Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Unit 4
Completion of ITAAC 2.2.01.08 [Index Number 109]**

ITAAC Statement

Design Commitment

8. Containment electrical penetration assemblies are protected against currents that are greater than the continuous ratings.

Inspections, Tests, Analyses

An analysis for the as-built containment electrical penetration assemblies will be performed to demonstrate (1) that the maximum current of the circuits does not exceed the continuous rating of the containment electrical penetration assembly, or (2) that the circuits have redundant protection devices in series and that the redundant current protection devices are coordinated with the containment electrical penetration assembly's rated short circuit thermal capacity data and prevent current from exceeding the continuous current rating of the containment electrical penetration assembly.

Acceptance Criteria

Analysis exists for the as-built containment electrical penetration assemblies and concludes that the penetrations are protected against currents which are greater than their continuous ratings.

ITAAC Determination Basis

An analysis for the as-built containment electrical penetration assemblies is performed to demonstrate (1) that the maximum current of the circuits does not exceed the continuous rating of the containment electrical penetration assembly, or (2) that the circuits have redundant protection devices in series and that the redundant current protection devices are coordinated with the containment electrical penetration assembly's rated short circuit thermal capacity data and prevent current from exceeding the continuous current rating of the containment electrical penetration assembly.

Most low voltage instrumentation and communication circuits are self-limiting in that circuit resistance limits the fault current to a level that does not damage the penetration. The energy levels in the instrumentation and communication systems are such that damage cannot occur to the containment penetration. For circuits that are not self-limiting, an analysis is performed to verify the as-built containment electrical penetration assemblies are protected against currents that are greater than the manufacturer's continuous ratings. The analysis demonstrates that the maximum current of the circuits does not exceed the continuous rating of the containment electrical penetration assembly, or in circuits with high short circuit current, that each circuit has redundant protection devices in series, and that the redundant current protection devices are coordinated with the containment electrical penetration assembly rated short circuit thermal capacity curves, and the fault current does not exceed the penetration assembly rated short circuit thermal capacity curve in the continuous current time range. Each circuit that requires redundant protective devices is identified in the applicable protection coordination calculations. The containment electrical penetration assemblies analyzed are listed in Attachment A. Spare penetrations or penetrations containing low voltage instrumentation and communication circuits which are excluded from the analysis are noted in Attachment A.

The electrical penetrations are designed in accordance with IEEE Standard 317 (Reference 1). Qualification testing of the electrical penetrations is performed in accordance with IEEE Standard 317 and IEEE Standard 323 (Reference 2). The analysis of the as-built containment electrical penetration assemblies is performed in accordance with section 5.4 of IEEE Standard 741 (Reference 3). Analysis of Class 1E circuits is documented in APP-IDS-E0C-014 (Reference 4). Analysis of Non-Class 1E circuits is documented in APP-ECS-E0C-016 (Reference 5). The analysis results are summarized in SV4-CNS-Z0R-001 (Reference 6). The analysis results exist for the as-built containment electrical penetration assemblies and conclude that the penetrations are protected against fault currents which are greater than their continuous current ratings.

The Electrical Penetration Assemblies (EPA) Protection Analysis is available for NRC inspection as part of the ITAAC Completion Package (Reference 7).

ITAAC Finding Review

In accordance with plant procedures for ITAAC completion, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) performed a review of all ITAAC findings pertaining to the subject ITAAC and associated corrective actions. This review found that there are no relevant ITAAC findings associated with this ITAAC.

ITAAC Completion Statement

Based on the above information, SNC hereby notifies the NRC that ITAAC 2.2.01.08 was performed for VEGP Unit 4 and that the prescribed acceptance criteria were met.

Systems, structures, and components verified as part of this ITAAC are being maintained in their as-designed, ITAAC compliant condition in accordance with approved plant programs and procedures.

References (available for NRC inspection)

1. IEEE Standard 317-1983, "IEEE Standard for Electrical Penetration Assemblies in Containment Structures for Nuclear Power Generating Stations"
2. IEEE Standard 323-1974, "IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations"
3. IEEE Standard 741-1997, "IEEE Standard Criteria for the Protection of Class 1E Power Systems and Equipment in Nuclear Power Generating Stations"
4. APP-IDS-E0C-014, Rev. 4, "Verification of IDS Low Voltage Class 1E-Safety Related Electrical Penetrations"
5. APP-ECS-E0C-016, Rev. 4, "Verification of Primary and Backup Electrical Protection of the Low Voltage and Medium Voltage Non-Safety Related Power and Control Containment Electrical Penetrations."
6. SV4-CNS-ZOR-001, Rev. 0, "Vogtle Unit 4 Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies ITAAC 109 As-built Analysis Report"
7. 2.2.01.08-U4-CP-Rev0, ITAAC Completion Package

Attachment A

Containment System Electrical Penetration Assemblies (EPAs)*

| Tag No. | EPA Description – Equipment Name |
|-----------------------|----------------------------------|
| DAS-EY-P03Z ** | Electrical Penetration P03 |
| ECS-EY-P01X | Electrical Penetration P01 |
| ECS-EY-P02X | Electrical Penetration P02 |
| ECS-EY-P06Y | Electrical Penetration P06 |
| ECS-EY-P07X | Electrical Penetration P07 |
| ECS-EY-P09W | Electrical Penetration P09 |
| ECS-EY-P10W | Electrical Penetration P10 |
| IDSA-EY-P11Z** | Electrical Penetration P11 |
| IDSA-EY-P12Y | Electrical Penetration P12 |
| IDSA-EY-P13Y | Electrical Penetration P13 |
| IDSD-EY-P14Z ** | Electrical Penetration P14 |
| IDSD-EY-P15Y | Electrical Penetration P15 |
| IDSD-EY-P16Y | Electrical Penetration P16 |
| ECS-EY-P17X | Electrical Penetration P17 |
| ECS-EY-P18X | Electrical Penetration P18 |
| ECS-EY-P19Z ** | Electrical Penetration P19 |
| ECS-EY-P20Z ** | Electrical Penetration P20 |
| EDS-EY-P21Z ** | Electrical Penetration P21 |
| ECS-EY-P22X | Electrical Penetration P22 |
| ECS-EY-P23X | Electrical Penetration P23 |
| ECS-EY-P24 (Spare) ** | Electrical Penetration P24 |
| ECS-EY-P25W | Electrical Penetration P25 |
| ECS-EY-P26W | Electrical Penetration P26 |
| IDSC-EY-27Z ** | Electrical Penetration P27 |
| IDSC-EY-28Y | Electrical Penetration P28 |
| IDSC-EY-29Y | Electrical Penetration P29 |
| IDSB-EY-30Z ** | Electrical Penetration P30 |
| IDSB-EY-31Y | Electrical Penetration P31 |
| IDSB-EY-32Y | Electrical Penetration P32 |

* Excerpt from COL Table 2.2.1-1

** Denotes a spare or a penetration containing low voltage instrumentation/communication circuits which are excluded from analysis